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CORPORATE EMPLOYEE INTERVIEWS
AND THE
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
ALAN J. WEINSCHEL *
When a corporate client becomes involved in a situation poten-
tially requiring litigation, the first inclination of the corporation's at-
torney is to interview employees in order to determine exactly what
happened and to gauge the various facets of a possible lawsuit. The
results of these investigations are usually contained in a written
memorandum. Some time later, the lawyer may be confronted with
an opponent's discovery order compelling him to produce that memo-
randum, and may find, to his surprise, that under certain circum-
stances neither the attorney-client privilege nor the work product rule
protects this memorandum from discovery.
Whether an attorney's memorandum may be discovered will de-
pend upon whether (I) the corporation's attorney-client privilege may
be asserted, or (2) the individual's attorney-client privilege may be
asserted, or (3) the attorney's work product rule is applicable, and,
if so, whether sufficient "good cause" has been shown to warrant dis-
covery. Although recently presented with an opportunity to clarify
this aspect of privileged communications, the Supreme Court merely
affirmed without opinion (in a 4-4 decision) a Seventh Circuit case
taking a new approach to the attorney-corporate client question.' This
article will explore the problems involved in the assertion of the
attorney-client privilege in the corporate context, as well as those is-
sues arising in the area of review of district court discovery orders.
I. ASSERTION OF THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT
PRIVILEGE BY THE CORPORATION
Rule 26 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states quite
clearly that discovery extends only to matters "not privileged." This
rule has been interpreted so as to define "privilege" in its usual evi-
dentiary sense.' In United States v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
Judge Wyzanski set forth the definitive rule regarding the attorney-
client privilege:
The privilege applies only if (1) the asserted holder of the
privilege is or sought to become a client; (2) the person to
whom the communication was made (a) is a member of the
* :la, 1969, New York University; Member, New York Bar.
1
 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker,
	 U.S.	 , 91 S. CI 479
(1971), aff'g 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970).
2 United States v. Reynolds, 345 U.S. 1, 6 (1953).
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bar of a court, or his subordinate, and (b) in connection
with this communication is acting as a lawyer; (3) the com-
munication relates to a fact of which the attorney was in-
formed (a) by his client, (b) without the presence of
strangers, (c) for the purpose of securing primarily either
(i) an opinion on law or (ii) legal services or (iii) assistance
in some legal proceeding, and not (d) for the purpose of
committing a crime or tort; and (4) the privilege has been
(a) claimed and (b) not waived by the client. 8
Although the attorney-client privilege applies to corporations, 4
the corporation's privilege cannot apply to all communications made
by every employee. Thus, the courts have found it necessary to de-
velop standards by which to determine which employee statements
are protected.
A. The Control Group Test
In the leading case of City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse
Electric Corp.8 (Westinghouse), the attorney-client privilege was as-
serted on behalf of Westinghouse and an employee who was inter-
viewed by the corporation's attorneys subsequent to his appearance
before a grand jury. The court held that the attorney-client privilege
as applied to corporate communications was limited to communica-
tions "made for the purpose of securing legal advice or assistance .. .
for the person or corporation making the communication":°
Keeping in mind that the question is, Is it the corporation
which is seeking the lawyer's advice when the asserted privi-
leged communication is made?, the most satisfactory solution,
I think, is that if the employee making the communication,
of whatever rank he may be, is in a position to control or
even to take a substantial part in a decision about any action
which the corporation may take upon the advice of the at-
torney, or if he is an authorized member of a body or group
which has that authority, then, in effect, he is (or personifies)
the corporation when he makes his disclosure to the lawyer
8 89 F. Supp. 357, 358-59 (D. Mass. 1950).
4 Radiant Burners, Inc. v. American Gas Ass'n, 320 F.2d 314, 323 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 375 U.S. 929 (1963). At the district court level, Judge Campbell held that the
attorney-client privilege was not available to a corporation. 209 F. Supp. 321, 324 (N.D.
Ill. 1962) ; 207 F. Supp. 771, 773 (N.D. Ill. 1962). The decision was reversed by the ,
Seventh Circuit, and since that time there has been no serious doubt that the privilege
is available to corporations. 320 F.2d 314 (1963). See also Bell v. ,Maryland, 378 U.S.
226, 263, (1964) (appendix to opinion of Douglas, J. (concurring opinion)).
210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa. 1962).
Id. at 484.
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and the privilege would apply. In all other cases the em-
ployee would be merely giving information to the lawyer to
enable the latter to advise those in the corporation having
the authority to act or refrain from acting on the advice.?
(Emphasis added.)
The Westinghouse decision is based in part upon a disagreement
with language in United Shoes suggesting that the attorney-client
privilege extends to a broad class of corporate employees. The court
believed that this statement of the privilege conflicted with the rule in
Hickman v. Taylor,' which the court interpreted as distinguishing
between statements by employees and statements by the corporation.'
The court in Westinghouse failed to perceive that Hickman was pri-
marily based not upon the corporate status of the individuals making
the statements, but rather upon the nature of the statements them-
selves (e.g., ordinary business records of the corporation). It does
not necessarily follow from the Hickman decision that the attorney-
client privilege does not extend to communications by employees to
corporate attorneys. In fact, the most that can be deduced from Hick-
man is that where an employee communicates to a corporate attorney
descriptions of what he saw as a witness, those communications are
not protected by the corporation's attorney-client privilege. Clearly
there is a practical, and arguably a legal, distinction between such
communications and those of an employee concerning the performance
of the duties of his employment. The Westinghouse "control group"
test has also been roundly criticized because it unreasonably narrows
the number of corporate employees eligible to communicate in confi-
dence with corporate attorneys. Because an attorney investigating a
complex case will want to interview many employees, he is placed
upon the horns of a dilemma. He must "choose between advising his
client on the basis of a partial or restricted factual disclosure or, by
obtaining all the necessary facts from all employees of whatever level,
running the risk of becoming an informer.' The rule thus appears
to be at odds with the traditional rationale for the attorney-client
privilege: "to promote freedom of consultation of legal advisers by
clients [by removing] the apprehension of compelled disclosure by
the legal advisers.""
7 Id. at 485.
8 89 F. Supp. at 360.
0 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
10 210 F. Supp. at 485.
11 Willis, The Inroads of Pre-Trial Discovery on Attorney Client Privilege, 1966
N.Y.S.B.A. Antitrust Law Symposium 109, 122.
12 g Wigmore, Evidence 2291 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961). See also Simon, The
Attorney-Client Privilege as Applied to Corporations, 65 Yale L.J. 953, 953-55 (1956).
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Moreover, the Westinghouse reasoning results in the curious
anomaly that the more serious the problem faced by a corporation, and
the more serious the litigation, the fewer corporate employee-attorney
communications will be privileged." Because the privilege is limited
to those employees capable of exercising some control in a corporate
decision influenced or determined by counsel's advice, where complex
and important issues are involved, only communications by the persons
having "the very highest authority714 are protected. The attorney
dealing with an alleged violation of the antitrust laws, for example, is
thus faced with a "Hobson's choice." If he interviews employees not
having "the very highest authority," their communications to him
will not be privileged. If, on the other hand, he interviews only those
with "the very highest authority," he may find it extremely difficult,
if not impossible, to determine what actually transpired. Furthermore,
this control group test ignores the fact that middle management execu-
tives, while not having the final word on major corporate issues, never-
theless play a major role in the decision-making process. Their advice
may be sought by upper echelon company executives, or they may
in fact make decisions which are subsequently perfunctorily approved
by their superiors."
The reasoning in Westinghouse was rejected by the Seventh Cir-
cuit in Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker." There, in granting
a writ of mandamus to review the district court's discovery order, the
court concluded "that the control group test [used by the trial court]
is not wholly adequate,' and that:
[T]he corporation's attorney-client privilege protects com-
munications of some corporate agents who are not within the
control group . . . .
It is clear that we are not dealing in this case with the
communications of employees about matters as to which they
are virtually indistinguishable from bystander witnesses;
employees who, almost fortuitously, observe events which
may generate liability on the part of the corporation . . . .
We conclude that an employee of a corporation, though
not a member of its control group, is sufficiently identified
with the corporation so that his communication to the corpo-
ration's attorney is privileged where the employee makes
13 See Lasky, Lawyer-Client Privilege, 38 Calif. S.B.J. 427, 440 (1963).
14 210 F. Supp. at 486.
15 See Maurer, Privileged Communications and the Corporate Counsel, 28 Ala. Law.
352, 367-69 (1967).
10 423 F.2d 487 (7th Cir. 1970).
17 Id. at 491.
876
CORPORATIONS AND THE ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
the communication at the direction of his superiors in the
corporation and where the subject matter upon which the
attorney's advice is sought by the corporation and dealt with
in the communication is the performance by the employee of
the duties of his employment." (Emphasis added.)
The court thus expressly rejected the Westinghouse concept of an
attorney-client privilege limited to corporate officials with the power
to act upon legal advice, holding instead that where an employee
communicates with the corporation's attorneys at the behest of his
superiors, regarding the performance of his duties of employment,
the corporation's attorney-client privilege is applicable.
Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit's opinion in Harper & Row
stands as a lonely monument to reason in a sea of confusion. The
Supreme Court has begged the question, while generally the lower
federal courts have been swept along by the Westinghouse decision
and the idea that "it is common knowledge that the scope of discovery
in civil antitrust cases is broad."' In Garrison v. General Motors
Corp.," for example, the plaintiffs sought inspection of documents
relating to discussions between several attorneys and the senior project
engineer, assistant chief engineer, chief engineer and division manager
of defendant's Saginaw Steering Gear Division referring to patent
validity and infringement. Citing Westinghouse, the court held that
only those communications made by the division manager and chief
engineer were privileged.
The control group test was also applied in Natta v. Hoganm to
exclude from the control group a "group leader-research division," a
"research chemist," and the "director-patent liaison," while including
the manager and assistant manager of Phillips Petroleum Company's
patent division.
[T] he test is whether the person has the authority to control,
or substantially participate in,. a decision regarding action
to be taken on the advice of a lawyer, or is an authorized
member of a group that has such power."
The Supreme Court's silent affirmance of Harper & Row does
little to clarify the law. Unless Harper & Row is more widely adopted,
therefore, whether the communication was made by a member of the
18 Id. at 491-92.
19 In re Special 1952 Grand Jury, 22 F.R.D. 102, 106 (E.D. Pa. 1958); See also
United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D. MIth. 1954).
20
 213 F. Supp. 515 (S.D. Cal. 1963).'
21 392 F.2d 686 (10th Cir. 1968).
22 Id. at 692.
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"control group" of the corporation will remain a key factual inquiry
whenever discovery is sought.
Although Westinghouse explicitly rejected a determination based
solely upon the rank of the employee within the corporation," sub-
sequent cases have used corporate rank as a factor in determining
whether control is present, and have found communications from the
secretary of a trade association,24
 executives," and the executive
assistant to a vice-president" to be privileged. Apart from the appar-
ent propensity on the part of the courts to include high-ranking execu-
tives within the control group, actual, rather than apparent, control
will be the determinant. In order to establish the privilege, a factual
basis for authority to act upon legal advice may have to be shown."
An affidavit establishing the witnesses' exact duties within the corpora-
tion, including a statement to the effect that consultation with counsel
and action upon that advice are part of the duties of employment,
would be helpful.
B. Confidentiality
It should be noted at this point that even if an individual is
found to be part of the corporation's control group, all of the criteria
of the attorney-client privilege must be established before the priv-
ilege may be asserted. With regard to corporations, the most im-
portant, as well as the most easily violated requirement, is that of
confidentiality. A communication not made in confidence (e.g., with
strangers present), or a written communication distributed generally
throughout the corporation, will not be privileged. In addition, a
communication which was originally confidential, and thus privileged,
may lose that status upon subsequent communication to other persons.
Indeed, it has been held that a corporation may lose the privilege by
filing a document in its general files." One of the key facts, perhaps
dispositive, in Westinghouse was the court's finding that the communi-
cations were not made in confidence. The attorneys had advised the
persons making disclosures that, while their communications were
"privileged," should any violations of company policy thereby be
revealed, they would be passed on to the proper company officials.
22 210 F. Supp. at 485.
24
 Philadephia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 291 F. Supp. 241 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
25 8 in 1 Pet Prods. v. Swift & Co., 218 F. Supp. 253 (S.D.N.Y. 1963).
28
 Leve v. General Motors Corp., 43 F.R.D. 508 (S.D.N.Y. 1967).
27 Philadelphia Housing Authority v. American Radiator & Standard Sanitary
Corp., 291 F. Supp. 247, 251 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
28 See, e.g.,' United States v. Kelsey-Hayes Wheel Co., 15 F.R.D. 461, 465 (E.D.
Mich. 1954).
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The court's reaction was quite clear: "This disposes of any possible
claim that the communications were confidential.""
The question of confidentiality most often arises in the context
of an exchange of memoranda among attorneys for co-defendants or
potential co-defendants. In Continental Oil Co. v. United States,3° the
only federal case to deal directly with this question, executives of both
Standard Oil and Continental Oil were summoned before a grand jury,
and were interviewed by counsel both before and after their testimony.
Attorneys for Standard and Continental exchanged memoranda sum-
marizing the interviews in order to apprise each other of the nature
and scope of the grand jury inquiry. The court held that the exchange
of documents did not constitute a breach of confidence so as to abro-
gate the attorney-client privilege. The court relied upon a Minnesota
case holding that where documents are exchanged between attorneys
engaged in maintaining substantially the same cause on behalf of
different parties to the same or similar litigation, the communications
are privileged. 81
 The court rejected the government's contention that
because there was no indictment at this stage of the proceedings there
could be no joint defendants and thus- no attorney-client privilege.
The court stated that the attorney-client privilege exists "irrespective
of litigation begun or contemplated,"" and that "[t]he grand jury is
an arm of the court and its in camera proceedings constitute a 'judicial
inquiry.' "88
Under the control group test, therefore, an attorney's memoran-
dum summarizing an interview with a corporate employee may be pro-
tected by the corporation's attorney-client privilege if the corporation,
through a member of its control group, is seeking legal advice. Mem-
bers of the control group must possess actual authority to act upon
that advice, no matter what their corporate rank; however, persons in
the very highest corporate positions will probably be presumed to
possess that authority. In addition, the debriefing interview must be
conducted without the presence of strangers, and any resulting
memoranda must remain strictly confidential.
Because of the complexity of modern corporations and lawsuits,
the control group test unreasonably restricts the lawyer representing
the corporation. The Harper & Row "scope of employment" standard
presents a more workable alternative, without unduly restricting those
who are attempting discovery.
29 210 F. Stipp. at 484.
30 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964).
81
 Schmitt v. Emery, 211 Minn. 547, 2 Is1.W.2d 413 (1942).
82 330 F.2d at 350, citing 8 Wigmore, Evidence 2294 (McNaughton rev. ed. 1961);
Alexander v. United States, 138 U.S. 353, 358 (1891).
88
 330 F.2d at 350, citing Levine v. United States, 362 U.S. 610, 617 (1960).
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II. ASSERTION OF THE INDIVIDUAL'S
ATTORNEY-CLIENT PRIVILEGE
If it can be demonstrated that the communication in question
was made in furtherance of an attorney-client relationship between
the employee and his attorney, the privilege will, of course, apply.
Whether or not the individual privilege is applicable will be a question
of fact to be determined on a case-by-case basis. In Continental Oil
Co. v. United States," the court found no inconsistency in the fact
that the attorneys who took statements of witnesses represented not
only the defendant corporations, but also the witnesses as individuals.
It was sufficient that "they were called upon to advise and represent
the persons from whom such statements were taken." 85 The court was
silent, however, as to exactly what constituted the advice and repre-
sentation.
In Harper & Row, the Seventh Circuit accepted the finding of
the district court that no personal attorney-client relationship existed
because the record failed to show that the attorneys (1) rendered
personal legal advice to the witnesses, (2) advised them on personal
matters, or (3) billed them for services rendered." Apparently, had
the three criteria been met, a personal attorney-client relationship
would have been found to exist.
There are several problems inherent in the assertion of the in-
dividual attorney-client privilege where the attorney is representing
both the corporation and the individual. The first is the question of
confidentiality. Even where there is no explicit understanding between .
the attorney and the individual that the information which the individ-
ual discloses may later be reported to his corporate superiors," it may
still be asserted that where the attorney's first loyalty is to the cor-
poration, a confidential relationship with the individual cannot con-
sistently exist. This result, however, seems unsatisfactory. It would
prevent an attorney from representing two clients, both of whom have
similar or identical interests, and both of whom may be prosecuted
jointly under the antitrust laws. It may be convenient for all parties
for one attorney to represent both the corporation and the individual
employees. Should it be revealed to the attorney during the course of
his investigation that the interests of the individual and the corporation
are divergent, it is his ethical duty to request that he be permitted to
withdraw as counsel for one of them, presumably the individual,
84 330 F.2d 347 (9th Cir. 1964).
85 Id. at 349.
38 423 F.2d at 490.
87
 See, e.g., City of Philadelphia v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D.
Pa. 1962).
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advising his client to consult another attorney. Where the individual
employee is informed beforehand that this parting of the ways may
take place, and agrees nevertheless to be represented by the corporate
attorney, the confidentiality problem should be no barrier to the
assertion of the attorney-client privilege.
The second question involves the extent to which the individual
attorney-client privilege should be applied. Clearly, every employee
on the corporate payroll may not be deemed a client. Only where the
circumstances of the case make it reasonable to conclude that the
individual would logically retain his own attorney should the assertion
be accepted. A clear case would involve an individual who might be
liable personally under the antitrust laws for criminal penalties. It is
natural to assume that such an individual would require his own
counsel to represent him.
Finally, the fact that the individual is not billed separately for the
attorney's services should not be a bar to his assertion of the privilege.
Payment of a fee is not a prerequisite of an attorney-client relation-
ship, and it is not reasonable to assume that the corporate attorney
would require one in such circumstances.
It should be noted that if the individuals are not themselves party
defendants to a lawsuit, they will be unable personally to assert the
attorney-client privilege. However, the attorneys might assert their
obligations to the individuals, even though they appear only on behalf
of the corporation.88
III. WORK PRODUCT PROTECTION
Should the attorney-client privilege, either individual or cor-
porate, be unavailable or rejected, the memorandum of the lawyer
faced with a motion for discovery may be protected by the attorney's
work product rule." There is no question, for example, that a memo-
randum debriefing a grand jury witness is part of the attorney's work
product. "Where an attorney personally prepares a memorandum of
an interview of a witness with an eye toward litigation, such memo-
randum qualifies as work product even though the lawyer functioned
primarily as an investigator."'"
In Ledge Hill Farms, Inc. v. W.R. Grace & Company, inc.,41 a
Robinson-Patman Act violation was asserted by a customer against a
manufacturer for alleged preferential treatment of another customer.
In a previous suit by a third customer, defendant's house counsel in-
88
 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 490 (7th Cir. 1970).
89 Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
40 423 F.2d at 492. See also United States v. Aluminum Co. of America, 34 F.R.D.
241, 242-43 (ED. Mo. 1963).
41 1963 Trade Cas. 11 70,765, at 78,086 (S.D.N.Y.).
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terviewed potential witnesses and prepared memoranda for the use of
trial counsel. Work product protection was accorded these interviews
and memoranda, despite the fact that they had not been taken in
"specific contemplation of the instant suit."42 They were protected
because they were taken in contemplation of any litigation which
might arise out of the same general facts. The plaintiff's "flat assertion
that it cannot obtain the information" 43 is not sufficient to vitiate the
"work product" privilege.
Hickman v. Taylor held that the work product exemption is
subject to a showing, on the part of the trial opponent, of "good cause"
for the production of documents or other materials. The court stated,
"where relevant and non-privileged facts remain hidden in an at-
torney's file and where production of those facts is essential to the
preparation of one's case, discovery may properly be had."" The
burden of showing good cause is on the party seeking discovery. Thus,
in Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co.," it was
said that where uncontroverted affidavits are filed in support of a claim
of work product protection, in order "to overcome [the] prima facie
showing that the documents are entitled to protection from discovery
based on work product, they must first convince the court that the
documents are essential to the preparation of their case.' Rejected
in Commonwealth Edison was plaintiff's contention that the unique
character of the electrical conspiracy cases was, in itself, sufficient to
show good cause for the production of documents otherwise protected
by the work product rule. The court held that particularized good
cause was necessary.
In other words, he must show that there are special circum-
stances in his particular case which make it essential to the
preparation of his case and in the interest of justice that the
statements be produced for his inspection or copying."
Despite the use by the Supreme Court in Hickman v. Taylor of
the word "essential" in characterizing the good cause necessary for
production of an attorney's work product, most federal courts have
adopted a balancing test for determining whether such good cause has
been shown:
42 Id. at 78,087.
43 Id. at 78,088.
44 329 U.S. at 511.
42 Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 211 F. Supp. 736 (N.D.
III. 1962).
40 Id. at 740.
47 Id. at 741, citing Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971, 978 (3d Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 967 (1950).
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The privilege of the lawyer's work product and the showing of
good cause sufficient to overcome it are interdependent, and
when as here, the factors supporting the claim of privilege,
are weak, the requisite showing of good cause is correspond-
ingly lessened.'
Good cause has been held not to exist because a witness may be
hostile or may refuse to make a statement;" nor is it made out upon
mere surmise or suspicion that impeaching material might be found in
prior statements." On the other hand, in Harper & Row, the Seventh
Circuit sustained the district court's finding that good cause was shown
by material discrepancies and by failure to recall significant facts when
a particular witness' grand jury testimony was compared with his
deposition." And, although the court would have preferred more
specific findings, since on a motion for writ of mandamus the movant
must show that he is clearly entitled to relief, where a six-year period
has elapsed between grand jury testimony and pre-trial depositions,
"lack of good cause [has] not been made to appear sufficiently for
issuance of a writ of mandamus." 52 In addition, good cause has been
found where witnesses were unavailable," and
[w]here . . . it appears that one party has exclusive control
over the circumstances surrounding an event and exclusive or
superior opportunity to know or ascertain the facts, we believe
that good cause exists to require that party's disclosure of
such portions of any report as might contain the statements
of witnesses or facts personally observed by the investigator
even though, as here, the identity of potential witnesses has
already been disclosed. . ."
The foregoing appears consistent with several other cases holding
that good cause is not made out where the party seeking discovery has
independent means of ascertaining the information contained in the
48 United States v. Swift & Co., 24 F.R.D. 280, 284 (N.D. Iil. 1959).
49 Tandy & Allen Const. Co. v. Peerless Cas. Co., 20 F.R.D. 223 (S.D.N.Y. 1957) ;
United States v. Deere & Co., 9 F.R.D. 523 (D. Minn. 1949).
au Hauger v. Chicago, Rock 1. & P. R. Co., 216 F.2d 501 (7th Cir. 1954) ; Hudalla
v. Chicago, M., St. P. & P. R. Co., 10 F.R.D. 363 (D. Minn. 1950).
51 423 F.2d at 492. Cf. Consolidated Edison Co. v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 217 F.
Supp. 36, 38 (S.D.N.Y. 1963), where release of portions of grand jury testimony was
allowed on the ground that "there are either material discrepancies on important
factual issues between . . . Grand Jury testimony and deposition testimony or significant
facts that the witness failed to recall at the deposition."
52 423 F.2d at 492.
53 Williams v. Northern Pac. Ry. Co., 30 F.R.D. 26, 28 (D. Mont. 1962).
54 People of the State of California v. United States, 27 F.R.D. 261, 262 (ND.
Cal. 1961).
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material sought." Along the same lines, where the party seeking dis-
covery is merely uncertain about the exact happenings of particular
meetings, good cause will not be made out. The purpose of the broad
discovery allowable in federal courts is not to abrogate completely the
adversary nature of a trial. A lawyer must still build his own case, and
only when information is unavailable to him from sources other than
his adversary should discovery be allowed."
In Ceco Steel Prod. Corp. v. H.K. Porter Co.," defendants, in
deponing a vice-president of plaintiff, questioned him concerning a
conversation at a meeting with plaintiff's trial counsel and assistant
general counsel, attended by three employees of plaintiff's insurer. The
witness refused to answer on grounds of work product and attorney-
client privilege, and his refusal was upheld by the court. According
to the court, to ask the witness to report the conversation was, in
effect, to seek possible statements of counsel which the witness may
have heard. The witness' "own statements may reflect what plaintiff's
counsel thought were the strong and weak points in Ceco's case." The
court continued:
Where there is, as here, uncertainty as to what in fact tran-
spired at a given meeting and no ineluctable showing of neces-
sity, the policy underlying the work product protection which
guards against the mischief (e.g., lawyers called to testify for
the purpose of impeaching the statements of their witnesses
made in preparation of trial) and unfairness (e.g., the opinion
of an attorney on the merits of his client's case or defense)
in forcing disclosure of the contents of such a meeting will
prevail. . . .
Frustrated discovery cannot be used as a basis for delving
into areas which . . . ought to be protected, for this would
make an absolute out of discovery."
Rule 26(b) (3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, effective
July 1, 1970, provides:
[A] party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible
things otherwise discoverable ... and prepared in anticipation
55 See, e.g., Roebling v. Anderson, 257 F.2d 615, 620 (D.C. Cir. 1958); Hogan v.
Zletz, 43 F.R.D. 308, 314 (N.D. Okla. 1967).
58 Justice Jackson, concurring in Hickman v. Taylor, responded to the argument
that a lawsuit was no longer a "battle of wits between counsel" stating: "[A] common
law trial is and always should be an adversary proceeding. Discovery was hardly intended
to enable a learned profession to perform its functions either without wits or on wits
borrowed from the adversary." 329 U.S. at 516.
57 31 F.R.D. 142 (N.D. Ill. 1962).
58 Id. at 144.
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of litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for
that other party's representative (including his attorney, con-
sultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only upon a
showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need
of the materials in the preparation of his case and that he is
unable without undue hardship to obtain the substantial equiv-
alent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery
of such materials when the required showing has been made,
the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impres-
sions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or
other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
The new rule's standard of "substantial need" is an apparent dis-
tillation of prior case law interpretations of Hickman v. Taylor. In
addition, there is a specific articulation of the requirement that un-
availability of other sources be shown. It was the drafters' intent to
codify the Hickman rule, incorporating case law refinements." Thus,
no substantial change of direction in the work product area can be
foreseen.
IV. REVIEW OF DISTRICT COURT DISCOVERY ORDERS
A significant question still exists regarding whether a district
court order for the production of documents claimed to be privileged
may be appealed. Such an order clearly is not a final decision under
28 U.S.C. § 1291. As an interlocutory decision, it is reviewable only if
the district court judge certifies" that the issue should be reviewed by
the court of appeals, or through the writs of mandamus or prohibition.
Should the district court certify the issue, there will, of course, be no
question about the right to appeal. It is where the court refuses to
make such a certification that problems arise.
In Harper & Row, the Seventh Circuit granted a mandamus "be-
cause maintenance of the attorney-client privilege up to its proper
limits has substantial importance to the administration of justice, and
because an appeal after disclosure of the privileged communication is
an inadequate remedy."' The Supreme Court apparently agreed by
hearing the case. Earlier decisions, of course, took a different view. The
court in Westinghouse refused to certify the attorney-client privilege
issue for interlocutory appeal on the ground that there was no "con-
trolling question of law" within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b).
The Third Circuit was petitioned for a writ of prohibition and manda-
59 Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure Relating to
Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 497 (1970). Advisory Committee's Note to Amend Rule 26.
eo 28 U.S.C.	 1292 (b) (1964).
01 Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Decker, 423 F.2d 487, 492 (7th Cir. 1970).
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mus, which was denied; the Supreme Court denied certiorari." Since
the merits of the attorney-client privilege issue were not raised in
either the Third Circuit or the Supreme Court, it is logical to conclude
that the denials were based upon the non-availability of mandamus or
prohibition in such a situation.
Several other cases have considered the question of the appeal-
ability of a district court's refusal to quash a subpoena duces tecum
calling for the production of privileged material. The Ninth Circuit,
in Continental Oil Co., concluded that such an order was appealable,
"either by way of appeal ... or by way of mandamus or prohibition." 63
However, the Ninth Circuit recently reversed its position on the same
issue, and held that relief under the All Writs Act" was not appro-
priate because such relief was limited to "exceptional cases amounting
to a judicial usurpation of power."" Again, the Supreme Court denied
certiorari. Prior Supreme Court cases support the conclusion that
relief under the All Writs Act is appropriate only in extraordinary
cases, and clearly inappropriate to review an order refusing to quash
a subpoena duces tecum." Harper & Row may have overruled these
cases, albeit sub silentio.
If neither mandamus nor prohibition were available to review a
discovery order, the only method for bringing such an issue before an
appellate court, other than certification by the trial judge, would be
to refuse to produce the documents and appeal from the resulting de-
fault judgment or contempt citation. Obviously, these alternatives are
far from pleasant, and every effort should be made to insure that
sufficient precautions are taken so that a district court ruling on a
discovery motion will be in favor of maintaining the privileged status
of the documents.'
CONCLUSION
Since the Supreme Court chose not to speak with regard to the
corporate attorney-client privilege, the control group test promulgated
in Westinghouse must still be reckoned with. The Harper & Row
"duties of employment" test, while eminently more sensible, and af-
02 210 F. Supp. 483 (E.D. Pa.), mandamus and prohibition denied sub nom. General
Elec. Co. v. Kirkpatrick, 312 F.2d 742 (3rd Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 943 (1963).
a 330 F.2d at 349.
04 28 U.S.C.	 1651 (1964).
66 Bolker v. United States, 418 F.2d 215, 217 (9th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397
U.S. 919, rehearing denied, 397 U.S. 1003 (1970).
60 See, e.g., Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 97-98 (1967) ; Cobbledick v. United
States, 309 U.S. 323 (1940).
07 Even if mandamus is available, the party requesting it must show that he clearly
is entitled to relief, and may have to show "lack of good cause [for production] sufficient
for issuance of a writ of mandamus." 423 F.2d at 492.
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firmed by the Court, has not been widely adopted. It is likely that
many district courts and state courts will continue to adhere to the
control group standard.
The real problem facing the practicing lawyer revolves around
those employees who cannot realistically assert the individual privilege,
and who, in all likelihood, will not be considered to be part of the con-
trol group. As to this genre of employee, an affidavit should be prepared,
stating that the communication is being made at the direction of the
employee's corporate superiors, and that the subject matter of the
communication is "the performance by the employee of the duties of
his employment." In this manner, should litigation result, and should
the forum court choose to adopt the Harper & Row rationale, the com-
munication will be protected by the corporation's attorney-client privi-
lege.
Where neither the corporate nor the individual attorney-client
privilege can be asserted, the rules regarding the attorney's work
product become relevant. Under both the existing Federal Rules and
the amended Rules which became effective July 1, 1970, the party
seeking discovery must make a showing that there is "substantial need"
for the materials sought, and that an alternate source is unavailable, in
order to overcome the protection of the work product rule. However,
the parameters of substantial need can be determined only on a case-
by-case basis.
Review of a district court discovery order is difficult notwithstand-
ing the court's apparent acceptance of mandamus as a device for
appeal. It is thus important to establish a foundation for the assertion
of the attorney-client privilege and work product protection well before
a lawsuit has been initiated.
887
BOSTON COLLEGE
INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL
LAW REVIEW
VOLUME XII
	
APRIL 1971	 NUMBER 5
BOARD OF EDITORS
EDWARD R. LEAnv
Editor in Chief
RAYMOND J. BRASSARD	 ROBERT P. CRONIN
Casenote and Comment Editor
	 Symposium Editor
ROBERT A. LUSARDI
	 THOMAS F. MAFFEI
Articles Editor
	 Casenote and Comment Editor
ROBERT F. MCLAUGHLIN	 F. ANTHONY MOONEY
Case and Solicitation Editor
	 Casenote and Comment Editor
ROBERT A. O'NEIL
	 Rim= A. PERRAS
Casenote and Comment Editor
	 Casenote and Comment Editor
SUSAN J. SANDLER	 WILLIAM T. SHERRY, JR.
Casenote and Comment Editor
	 Executive Editor
CARL M. WORBOYS	 JUDITH K. WYMAN
Articles Editor	 Articles Editor
EDITORIAL STAFF
RICHARD I. CHALFETZ
JOHN M. DESTKFANO, JR.
EDWARD P. DOHERTY
WILLIAM H. ISE
Jam; B. JOHNSON
DANIEL H. LIDMAN
JOHN J. MAROTTA
REVIEW STAFF
TERRANCE P. CHRISTENSON	 THOMAS E. HUMPHREY
BERNARD J. COONEY	 TIMOTHY E. Kim
ROBERT C. DAVIS
	
EDWARD J. MARKEY
WILLIAM F. DEMAREST
	
BARTON J. MENITOVE
WILLIAM L. EATON	 THOMAS J. MIZO
NICHOLAS K. FOWLER	 ROBERT T. NAGLE
WILLIAM A. GOLDSTEIN	 JOSEPH M. PIEPUL
MICHAEL S. GRECO
	
BRADFORD J. POWELL
PHILIP A. Wrcxv
FACULTY COMMITTEE ON PUBLICATIONS
WILLIAM F. Wax=
	
PETER A. DONOVAN
Chairman	 Faculty Adviser to the Law Review
DAVID W. CARROLL
	
PAUL G. GARRITY
CAROL CArnarsr	 FRANCES WE.PMAN
Administrative Secretary	 Business Secretary
888
